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Abstract The recent economic and financial turmoil raises
the question on how global economic growth affects agricul-
tural commodity markets and, hence, food security. To address
this question, this paper assesses the potential impacts of faster
economic growth in developed and emerging economies on
the one hand and a replication of the recent economic down-
turn on the other hand. The empirical analysis uses AGLINK-
COSIMO, a recursive-dynamic, partial equilibrium, supply–
demand model.
Simulation results demonstrate that higher economic
growth influences demand more than supply, resulting in
higher world market prices for agricultural commodities.
Emerging economies tend to import more and to stock less
in order to cover their demand needs, while the rest of the
world increases its exports. The modelled faster economic
growth also helps developing countries to improve their trade
balance, but does not necessarily give them the incentive to
address domestic food security concerns by boosting domestic
consumption. A replication of an economic downturn leads to
lower world prices, and while the magnitude of the effects
decreases over time, markets do not regain their baseline
levels within a 5-year period. Due to the lower world market
prices, developing countries import more and increase their
per capita food calorie intake. However, as developing coun-
tries become more import dependent, this also implies that
they become more vulnerable to disruptions in agricultural
world markets.
Keywords Economic growth . Agricultural commodity
markets . Food security
Introduction
The global food price crisis in 2008 and subsequent food price
spikes brought the topic of food security back to the top of the
international agenda. Critical questions have been raised on how
the poor (particularly those who are net importers, and hence
depend on food purchases from abroad) can secure their con-
sumption needs (FAO 2009; Brinkman et al. 2010). A great deal
of effort has been devoted to analysing the main causes of the
food price spike. Even though researchers put different weights
on the relative importance of underlying factors, it is now well
understood that the food price spike was caused by a combina-
tion of several factors that created a ‘perfect storm’ which
simultaneously affected both supply and demand: poor harvests
in various parts of the world, subsequent export restrictions for
several agricultural commodities by some countries, increasing
crude oil prices, increasing biofuel usage, decreasing crop yield
growth rates, global stock declines of several agricultural com-
modities, decreasing interest rates, increasing investment in
commodity funds (speculation), and the depreciation of the US
dollar (Headey and Fan 2008; Trostle 2008; Baffes and Haniotis
2010; Gilbert 2010; Naylor and Falcon 2010).
In 2011 food prices spiked again, with the World Bank
food price index reaching the peak of 2008 in early 2011,
potentially threatening food security once more (World Bank
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2012). However, most of the public and policy attention to the
global food security situation had already been pushed aside,
as turbulences in the global financial system and the overall
global economy made ‘economic crisis’ a term that entered
everyday vocabulary. The recent financial and economic crisis
hit developing countries as well as developed ones. While
many countries started to show signs of recovery, the ongoing
crisis in some countries in the Eurozone, worries about fiscal
sustainability in the USA and other countries, and the rapid
spreading of contagion fears and accompanying trade and
financial spillovers still threaten global economic recovery
(IMF 2013). This also illustrates that in the present global
economic environment, local problems can become global
ones very quickly, making it even more difficult to conduct
forecasts regarding the development of economic growth.
Assumptions on the development of economic growth form
the basis for commodity market outlooks. In such outlooks it is
usually assumed that economic growth follows a stable path in
the medium-term. The World Bank (2013a) suggests that the
effects of the 2008 economic crisis are not played out yet and
projects global GDP (expressed in real terms) to increase by a
modest 2.4 % in 2013, with GDP growing by 5.1 % in devel-
oping countries and 1.3 % in high-income countries. The
agricultural commodity outlook of FAPRI (2012) assumes real
GDP growth of 2.0 % in 2020, while the agricultural outlook of
OECD-FAO (2012) is set on a two speed economic recovery,
assuming that developing and emerging countries will show
quicker recovery signs than developed ones. Expectations on
economic growth are always subject to uncertainties, but in the
short run, more changes in the economic environment are likely
to take place (World Bank 2013a).
The overall economic condition and economic growth are
reflected in the demand for commodities and in input prices,
and hence entail rather strong implications for developments
on agricultural commodity markets. For example, increases in
GDP are associated with increasing income per capita and
changes in diets, often reflected in stronger demand for higher
value-added goods (like livestock products) and resulting in
increased consumption and, consequently, higher prices. In a
dynamic framework this can trigger a response on the supply
side, which could in turn drive prices downwards. In an
analogous way the reverse effects can be expected in the event
of a downwards economic shock (Abbott and McCalla 2002;
Timmer 2002; Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson 2010; FAO, WFP
and IFAD 2012). However, there is still little consensus on
whether the effects of economic growth on food consumption
can outweigh its impacts on production, and there is hardly
any empirical evidence on the magnitude of these effects.
Against this background, this paper analyses how negative
and positive shocks in the economic growth of major econo-
mies can affect agricultural commodity markets and food
security. Food security is generally considered to comprise
four pillars: availability (whether enough food is physically
available either through domestic production or imports),
access (physically and economically; relates to incomes, ex-
penditure, markets and prices), utilization (health and nutri-
tional diet concerns) and stability (whether a state of food
insecurity is transitory or permanent) (FAO 1996, 2009;
Pinstrup-Andersen 2009). Focusing on the pillar of food
availability and on aspects of access (expenditure and prices)
this paper addresses the following questions: What are the
impacts of a faster economic growth of developed and emerg-
ing economies on global agricultural commodity markets and
food security? Conversely, what are the impacts of a tempo-
rary economic crisis on agricultural markets and food security,
and how long does it take for the markets to regain their pre-
distortion equilibrium?
To answer these questions we use the dynamic, partial
equilibrium model AGLINK-COSIMO to simulate different
scenarios on exogenously assumed economic growth paths
over the next 10 years. Building on the OECD-FAO agricul-
tural outlook (OECD-FAO 2012), we simulate one faster
economic growth scenario and assess if demand reactions
are indeed bigger than supply adjustments, and if so, what
the effect on agricultural prices would be. In a second scenar-
io, we simulate a reoccurrence of the 2008–2009 economic
crisis with regard to negative shocks in GDP growth rates and
assess how prices develop, what the effects on commodity
balances are, how long it takes for agricultural markets to
return to their initial equilibrium, and how this affects global
food security.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes the AGLINK-COSIMO model and the underlying
assumptions of the simulated scenarios. Section 3 reports the
results with regard to changes in commodity balances, market
prices and in specified food security indicators. Section 4 dis-
cusses the results and section 5 concludes the paper.
Specification of the modelling approach
and the simulation scenarios
AGLINK-COSIMO is a global recursive-dynamic, partial
equilibrium, supply–demandmodel of world agricultural mar-
kets developed by the OECD Secretariat1 and the FAO (see
OECD 2006). AGLINK-COSIMO covers annual supply, de-
mand and prices for the principal agricultural commodities (all
major temperate zone agricultural commodities as well as rice
and vegetable oils) produced, consumed and traded in each of
the countries represented in the model. Biofuels (ethanol and
1 The results of any analysis based on the use of the AGLINK-COSIMO
model by parties outside the OECD are outside the responsibility of the
OECDSecretariat. Conclusions derived by third-party users of AGLINK-
COSIMO should not be attributed to the OECD or its member
governments.
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biodiesel) are modelled in detail only for the USA, the EU,
Brazil and Canada.2 The model is based on the following
assumptions:
– World markets are competitive and neither buyers nor
sellers have monopoly power on the market. The market
price is determined via global or regional equilibrium in
supply and demand.
– AGLINK–COSIMO is not a spatial model and therefore
importers do not distinguish the origin of commodities
(transport costs are not included).
– Commodities are considered as homogeneous, but prices
are cleared domestically and standard trade functions are
used to model trade policies. Thus the model represents
imports and exports of a country separately.
– AGLINK–COSIMO is a partial equilibriummodel focus-
ing on agricultural commodities. Non-agricultural mar-
kets are not modelled.
AGLINK-COSIMO is used for policy analysis and the
preparation of medium-term outlooks on the development of
agricultural commodity markets. The projection period used
in AGLINK-COSIMO is 10 years on an annual basis and
assumes a current policy framework, normal weather condi-
tions, and given and expected yield growth rates. The model
provides a consistent analysis framework and uses external
sources for the assumptions on macroeconomic developments
like GDP growth, exchange rates, world oil prices, population
growth, etc. (OECD-FAO 2012).
The model includes country specific information on agri-
cultural, biofuel and trade policies. It incorporates, for exam-
ple, import and export duties, market intervention and supply
management policies, as well as biofuel mandates and budget-
ary support measures. This information is updated annually by
the OECD and FAO secretariats, and thus allows an examina-
tion of agricultural markets in a setting that reflects up-to-date
policy developments. However, the model does not take into
account ad-hoc changes in policy mechanisms or goals that
may occur under volatile market situations, climate change or
financial market instability in the medium-run. Furthermore, it
does not explicitly incorporate risk aversion of producers and
consumers that may arise in the context of volatile commodity
markets. Finally, the model version used in this paper does not
employ any stochastic simulation method.
Consumer demand is assumed to react to consumer price
changes of the current year, with the responsiveness being higher
in developing countries compared to developed ones (i.e. de-
mand becomesmore inelastic as income rises). On average for all
commodities considered in the model, the own-price elasticity of
demand is about −0.65 in low-income countries and −0.3 in
developed ones (Thompson et al. 2012). Looking acrossmarkets,
food demand for meat and dairy products has a more elastic
reaction to income changes than do staple foods (on average the
respective elasticities are around 0.4 and 0.2 for red meat and
coarse grains, respectively) (OECD-FAO 2012). The elasticities
are kept constant for the simulation period of 10 years but are
revised regularly by the OECD and FAO secretariats.
For the purpose of this paper the model was adapted and
three indices have been developed to better depict food secu-
rity and food availability issues in developing and least devel-
oped countries: (i) a food bill index, which measures the food
expenditure on wheat, coarse grains, rice, vegetable oil and
meat and is given as the product of food consumption and
domestic consumer prices; (ii) a food import bill index, which
is supplementary to the first index and reports the cost of food
imports in USD; and (iii) a food calories per capita index,
which reports the consumed food calories per capita for crops;
thus covering only staple food3. All three indices are calculat-
ed for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and low- to middle-
income countries. The first two indices are reported in nom-
inal terms and indicate the actual expenditure consumers are
faced with. If the food bill index is growing more in real terms
than income (expressed in real GDP growth) this indicates that
consumers spend a larger share of their income for the pur-
chase of food, which may have negative implications for the
poor as the share of food expenditure in their income is
already high. The food import bill index is particularly rele-
vant for net importing countries facing balance of payment
constraints (for example foreign currency availability, insuffi-
cient reserves), and a rise of this index implies that these
countries may need to take out loans to finance purchases of
imported food, or that they risk currency depreciation which
would further increase domestic food prices.
In addition to these indices we also calculate the follow-
ing three ratios, which help to visualise the reaction in
agricultural markets to the macroeconomic shocks (FAO
2001): (i) import dependency ratio (IDR), which is the
share of imports over total domestic supply, with the latter
being defined as domestic production plus imports minus
exports; the IDR expresses how much of the available
domestic food supply comes from the country’s own pro-
duction and how much has been imported; (ii) self-suffi-
ciency ratio (SSR), which is calculated as the share of
domestic production over total domestic use and expresses
the magnitude of production in relation to domestic utiliza-
tion; and (iii) stock-to-use ratio, which is given as ending
stocks over domestic consumption and indicates the level
of carryover stock for the given commodity.
2 OECD (2008) gives more details on the modelling of biofuels in
AGLINK-COSIMO, while Blanco Fonseca et al. (2010) provide details
on the modelling and on the market impacts of EU biofuel policies.
3 We concentrate on staple foods because in terms of energy intake they
are the most important component in the average diet in developing
countries.
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The indices and the ratios have to be seen in a partial
equilibrium context. Impacts on other aspects of the economy,
which may affect the development of agriculture (e.g. a move-
ment of production towards other sectors or to crops not
modelled in AGLINK-COSIMO), are not taken into account,
implying that non-agricultural relative prices remain constant.
Three simulation scenarios were constructed. All scenarios
assume the same development of agricultural policies and
trade measures for the period 2012–2021 (OECD-FAO
2012), but they differ with regard to the assumed macroeco-
nomic developments. For the baseline (reference) scenario,
standard macroeconomic assumptions on economic growth
and exchange rate developments are taken from OECD-FAO
(2012). The short-run global economic outlook is rather weak,
but economic recovery is expected to start during 2013, led by
Asian countries that are projected to have the highest annual
GDP growth. In general, the reference scenario assumes a
two-speed growth dichotomy over the projection period, with
relatively weak medium-term income and employment
growth in developed countries, and much stronger growth in
emerging and developing countries. Emerging economies are
assumed to remain the high economic growth leaders, while
average GDP growth in OECD countries is expected to im-
prove to above 2 % per year and economic growth in the
LDCs is expected to moderate slightly to 5.8 % per year.
Table 1 summarises the assumed real GDP growth rates in
the baseline for emerging markets as well as the USA and the
EU.
Further exogenous developments are also set out as in
OECD-FAO (2012). It is assumed that the world price for
crude oil will increase over the simulation period from USD
79.54 per barrel in 2010 to USD 142 in 2021. Population
growth is assumed to slow over the projection period, increas-
ing on average by 1.02% per year. Even though the slowdown
in population growth is expected to occur in all regions,
developing countries will still experience the fastest popula-
tion growth, with Africa’s population growing at over 2 % per
year and thus more than double that of any other region
(OECD-FAO 2012).
To analyse how economic shocks may influence agricul-
tural commodity markets and global food availability, two
macroeconomic scenarios have been developed, assuming
different economic growth paths for the countries listed in
Table 1. These countries are selected because they are the
main agricultural commodity price makers in the world mar-
kets, and in addition, historical changes in GDP growth have
been the highest in these countries.
Scenario 1 simulates faster economic growth compared to
the reference scenario over the projection period. In order to
be able to introduce correlated adjustments, especially with
regard to exchange rate developments, the scenario replicates
a historic situation by using the annual GDP growth rates of
the year 2006. The year 2006 has been selected because it was
characterised by high global economic growth.
Scenario 2 simulates a downward shock in economic
growth in 2016. The point of reference for the economic shock
is the recent economic downturn of 2008–2009, and the
scenario uses respective GDP growth and takes the correlated
effects on exchange rates into account. Regarding crude oil
prices, the shock repeats the absolute difference in world
crude oil prices between 2008 and 2009.
Figure 1 illustrates the assumptions of all three scenarios
exemplified on the Brazilian GDP index. An analogous pat-
tern is followed for the rest of the countries under consider-
ation (see Table 1).
Simulation results
World market prices
Figures 2 and 3 depict the effects of the macroeconomic
shocks on world market prices for crop and livestock com-
modities, respectively.
The results of Scenario 1 show that higher economic
growth in emerging economies, the EU and the USA can
indeed alter the picture of agricultural markets and can lead
to higher world market prices. The simulated faster economic
growth stimulates demand and the increase in consumption is
higher than the production response. At the end of the simu-
lation period, wheat and coarse grains prices are almost 50 %
higher, and rice prices almost 40 % higher than the prices in
the reference scenario. The increase is even greater for oil-
seeds (+59 %) and vegetable oil (+52 %). The developments
in livestock and dairy markets follow a similar path, with the
Table 1 Baseline assumptions of real GDP growth from previous year,
in %
2012 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Argentina 4.6 6.1 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5
Brazil 3.2 3.9 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.2
China 6.8 8.3 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.4
EU-12 1.9 2.7 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8
EU-15 0.5 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.7
India 7.5 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
Indonesia 6.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Malaysia 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Mexico 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.0
Russia 4.1 4.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8
Thailand 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
USA 2.0 2.5 3.4 2.6 2.3 2.1
Source: OECD-FAO (2012)
4 All prices are nominal prices.
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effects being stronger for meat (beef and veal prices +58 %,
pork prices +44 %) than for dairy products (butter
prices +37 %, skim milk powder prices +36 %).
In Scenario 2, the simulated shock on economic growth
and the related reduction of crude oil prices negatively affect
demand in the year the shock was introduced (i.e. year 2016),
which in turn results in lower world market prices for agricul-
tural commodities. The supply response to lower market
prices is seen in the next year (2017), but the effects are
diverse among the markets. Cereals are projected to be more
affected, not only because cereal markets are generally more
reactive to price developments but also because the simulated
shock involved countries that are price-makers in cereal mar-
kets. Furthermore, the shock in crude oil price affects the
biofuel market, and hence the feedstocks (i.e. the shock in-
duces a temporary reduction of biofuel consumption, followed
by a temporary reduction of feedstock demand for biofuel use).
From 2018 onwards the markets start returning to their pre-
shock levels, with cereals again being more reactive.
Nonetheless, by 2021 world market prices for cereals are still
about 6 % below the baseline, while those for oilseeds and
livestock commodities are down about 5 %.
Trade effects, domestic supply, demand and stocks
Looking at world markets, faster economic growth as simu-
lated in Scenario 1 results in higher consumption and domestic
production worldwide, whereas the effects of the negative
economic shock simulated in Scenario 2 show a more diverse
picture with regard to supply and demand. In both scenarios,
major adjustments take place in the trade flows. Table 2
summarises the net export effects of all three scenarios on
staple food and livestock commodities.5 Scenario results are
presented for the years 2021 and 2016 (the latter to demon-
strate the impact of the negative economic shock in the year
the shock actually takes place). As we focus on the effect of
macroeconomic shocks on food security, we present results
for China, India, grouped LDCs and other low-income
countries.6
Faster economic growth as simulated in Scenario 1 in-
creases production in all low-income countries (including
LDCs), allowing them to boost their exports and reduce their
dependency on imports. By 2021, their import dependency
ratio decreases by up to 40 percentage points for oilseeds and
by nearly 15 percentage points for cereals, vegetable oil and
dairy products. African LDCs expand their coarse grains
exports so much that their net trade status changes and
they become net exporters of 7.1 million tonnes by
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Fig. 3 Development of world market prices for livestock commodities (in USD per tonne). Note: The simulation period is 2012–2021
5 Regarding livestock commodities we present the results for butter and
beef meat, as they are themost important dairy andmeat products in terms
of both traded volume and value in most developing and least developed
countries.
6 Countries are selected and grouped according to the World Bank
(2013b) and the UN (2013).
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Table 2 Net trade positions (in million tonnes)
2012 2016 2021
REF S1 S2 REF S1 S2
China Wheat −6.1 −4.0 −3.2 −4.0 −5.2 −3.6 −5.3
Coarse grains −5.7 −8.2 −8.1 −8.3 −10.9 −10.9 −10.9
Rice −0.2 −0.5 −0.4 −0.4 −0.6 −0.6 −0.6
Oilseeds −57.6 −64.8 −64.7 −65.1 −72.1 −72.9 −71.8
Vegetable oil −10.1 −10.3 −11.0 −10.4 −10.4 −11.7 −10.2
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 0.0
Butter 0.0 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.1 0.0
India Wheat 1.7 −2.4 −3.8 −2.4 −2.7 −6.0 −3.1
Coarse grains 2.3 −0.4 −1.0 −0.6 −0.5 −1.9 −0.6
Rice 7.0 4.8 1.8 4.9 5.3 0.5 5.5
Oilseeds −0.1 −0.1 −0.3 −0.1 0.0 −0.6 0.0
Vegetable oil −9.2 −10.3 −11.0 −10.5 −11.7 −13.2 −11.7
Beef meat 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.9
Butter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 0.0
LDC Africa1 Wheat −8.3 −9.0 −8.6 −9.2 −10.2 −9.6 −10.3
Coarse grains 0.5 −0.1 2.9 −1.3 −0.6 7.1 −1.7
Rice −4.5 −5.2 −4.4 −5.3 −5.5 −3.6 −5.8
Oilseeds 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2
Vegetable oil −1.7 −2.1 −1.9 −2.1 −2.6 −2.2 −2.6
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Butter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LDC rest of world2 Wheat −8.0 −8.0 −7.3 −8.4 −8.8 −7.2 −9.1
Coarse grains 0.0 −0.3 0.1 −0.4 −0.5 0.2 −0.7
Rice 0.5 0.9 3.0 0.3 2.7 7.4 2.2
Oilseeds −0.2 −0.3 −0.3 −0.3 −0.5 −0.3 −0.5
Vegetable oil −2.8 −3.1 −3.0 −3.1 −3.6 −3.4 −3.6
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Butter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
African low-income3 Wheat −25.4 −25.3 −24.4 −26.3 −27.3 −25.0 −27.7
Coarse grains −14.0 −15.2 −14.7 −15.8 −17.4 −15.8 −17.7
Rice −3.1 −3.2 −3.1 −3.3 −3.8 −3.5 −3.9
Oilseeds −2.7 −3.1 −3.0 −3.1 −3.6 −3.3 −3.6
Vegetable oil −3.7 −4.4 −4.2 −4.4 −5.1 −4.7 −5.1
Beef meat −0.4 −0.5 −0.3 −0.5 −0.6 −0.3 −0.7
Butter −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.2 −0.1 −0.2
Asian low-income4 Wheat −16.3 −16.3 −15.1 −17.1 −18.7 −15.8 −19.3
Coarse grains −4.7 −5.1 −4.3 −5.7 −6.6 −4.6 −6.9
Rice 6.7 9.4 10.5 9.1 9.7 11.4 9.7
Oilseeds −4.3 −4.7 −4.2 −4.7 −4.8 −4.0 −4.9
Vegetable oil 19.2 20.6 22.1 20.0 22.8 27.0 22.1
Beef meat −0.6 −0.7 −0.6 −0.7 −0.8 −0.6 −0.9
Butter −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
American low-income5 Wheat −5.9 −6.0 −5.9 −6.1 −6.3 −6.1 −6.4
Coarse grains −5.7 −6.2 −5.6 −6.6 −7.2 −5.4 −7.4
Rice −0.9 −1.0 −0.8 −1.0 −1.1 −0.5 −1.2
Oilseeds 4.6 5.7 6.6 5.5 7.0 9.3 6.7
Vegetable oil −0.1 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.2 −0.2
Beef meat 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0
Butter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net trade is given as exports minus imports; a positive (negative) value implies a net export (import) position
1. LDCs Africa: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia
2. LDCs in rest of world: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Haiti, Lao People’sDemocratic Republic,Maldives,Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Yemen
3. African low-income counties: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco,
Namibia, Réunion, Saint Helena, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tunisia, Zimbabwe
4. Asian low-income counties: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Philippines, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam
5. American low-income counties: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Georgia/Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands,
United States Virgin Islands, Venezuela
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2021 (compared to net imports of 0.6 million tonnes in
the reference scenario).
In China and India, developments in domestic agricultural
markets are particularly determined by the countries’ respec-
tive (trade) policies (Baldwin and Bonarriva 2013). In China,
imports of agricultural products are subject to the value-added
tax, levied at a rate of 13 %. In addition, there are tariff rate
quotas for wheat, sugar and rice (OECD 2013). In Scenario 1,
the consumption increases for wheat, coarse grains and rice in
China due to faster economic growth are smaller than the
increase in domestic production, which improves China’s
net trade position in these commodities. This holds particular-
ly for wheat, where net imports decrease by 31% compared to
the reference scenario. By contrast, consumption of beef meat
and dairy products rises more than domestic production,
which further deteriorates China’s net trade position. In
India, the government intervenes in the markets for wheat,
coarse grains and rice mainly via minimum support prices,
flexible setting of tariffs up to a high most-favoured nation
level and stock management (DAC India 2012; Shreedhar
et al. 2012). To satisfy increased domestic consumption trig-
gered by faster economic growth (Scenario 1), net imports in
India increase considerably by 2021, especially for wheat
(+122 % compared to the reference scenario) and coarse
grains (+258 %) while net exports decrease, especially for
rice (−90%) and beef meat (−37%). The domestic production
response is impeded by India’s policy of minimum support
prices, which are fixed by the government and can be expect-
ed to be set at a binding low level to counter the increased
world market prices; however stocks are projected to increase,
which is attributable to India’s stocking policy.
The self-sufficiency ratio increases due to the simulated
faster economic growth in all low-income countries, with
oilseeds and wheat in American low-income countries in-
creasing the most by 2021 (+17 and +16 percentage points
respectively) andwheat in non-African LDCs (+16 percentage
points) compared to the reference scenario (Table 3).
However, in most low-income and least developed countries,
and for most commodities, the increase is not so high as for
them to become self-sufficient (i.e. the self-sufficiency ratio
remains below 100 %). In China and India, the self-
sufficiency ratios of staple food, meat and dairy products
decline slightly by 2021 (by about 1 percentage point).
Although effects are strongly driven by different domestic
policies in these two countries, scenario results confirm that
consumption increases more than domestic production and is
met by higher imports.
The results of Scenario 2 show that a one-time downward
economic shock, taking place in a single year (2016) and only
in emerging economies, the EU and the USA, is sufficient to
affect world agricultural markets considerably, resulting in a
temporary decrease of consumption worldwide, followed by
reductions in domestic agricultural production. The specific
effects are different among countries and markets, but scenario
results indicate that due to lower commodity prices, LDCs and
low-income countries increase their net imports or decrease
their net exports (the effects are most pronounced for cereals).
Consequently, the import dependency ratio of LDCs and low-
income countries increases, especially for staple food. By 2021,
the highest changes in the import dependency ratio compared to
the reference scenario are increases of 25 and 21 percentage
points for oilseeds and coarse grains in non-African LDCs and
of 18 percentage points for coarse grains in African LDCs.
With declines in production and increased import depen-
dency, LDCs and low-income countries are generally slightly
less self-sufficient by 2021, with the effects being more visible
for beef meat and vegetable oil in low-income countries.
Compared to the reference scenario, the highest reduction of
the self-sufficiency ratio is a decrease of 5.2 percentage points
for beef meat in American low-income countries. The scenar-
io results suggest that the lower agricultural commodity prices
affect the producers in LDCs and low-income countries more
than the consumers, as the reduction in domestic production
causes their consumption needs to be met by higher imports.
On the other hand, self-sufficiency in China and India is
hardly affected by the economic shock (see Table 2).
Scenario results indicate that apart from re-distribution of
trade, short-term changes in stocks in particular contribute to
the re-balancing of the markets (see Table 4). As mentioned
above, faster economic growth (Scenario 1) leads to higher
consumption and production worldwide, but demand in-
creases more than supply, implying that ending stocks de-
crease so that rising worldwide consumption can be met.
The decrease in stocks is most pronounced in the early years
of faster economic growth and then almost levels out as
production further responds to the increasing demand.
However, despite the improvement in self-sufficiency, stock-
to-use ratios for staple food commodities in LDCs and in low-
income countries are still about 1 percentage point lower in
2021 compared to the reference scenario. Even though this
seems like only a small change, it has to be noted that ending
stocks for most commodities are already relatively low in the
reference scenario (except for wheat in non-African LDCs),
and for beef and other meat products stock-to-use ratios are
close to 0 %. By contrast, the one-time downward economic
shock in Scenario 2 leads to an immediate improvement of the
stock-to-use ratios of all commodities in LDCs and low-
income countries in the year the shock takes place (2016).
The improvement in each regional aggregate is most pro-
nounced for cereals and in particular for those cereals where
the stock-to-use ratios already had the highest pre-shock
levels. However, the improvements in the stock-to-use ratios
are only temporary and fade away over the projection period,
and by 2021 the stock-to-use ratios for most commodities are
even slightly below their respective levels in the reference
scenario.
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Table 3 Self-sufficiency (in percent)
2012 2016 2021
REF S1 S2 REF S1 S2
China Wheat 95.1 96.8 97.5 96.8 95.8 97.2 95.7
Coarse grains 97.2 96.3 96.4 96.2 95.4 95.7 95.4
Rice 99.8 99.6 99.7 99.7 99.5 99.6 99.5
Oilseeds 50.0 48.4 48.7 48.3 47.1 47.6 47.3
Vegetable oil 66.9 68.5 67.1 68.3 70.3 67.7 70.8
Beef meat 100.1 99.8 99.4 99.4 99.4 98.8 99.6
Butter 75.9 74.4 70.5 73.6 74.8 68.3 75.6
India Wheat 102.0 97.3 95.8 97.2 97.1 93.8 96.6
Coarse grains 105.8 99.0 97.6 98.6 98.8 95.8 98.7
Rice 107.2 104.5 101.7 104.6 104.7 100.5 104.9
Oilseeds 99.8 99.8 99.2 99.7 100.0 98.5 99.9
Vegetable oil 42.7 41.2 39.6 40.8 40.2 37.0 40.1
Beef meat 141.1 138.7 138.4 136.2 138.7 123.6 135.5
Butter 100.0 100.1 99.7 100.0 100.1 98.7 100.1
LDC Africa Wheat 35.3 37.8 40.1 37.1 40.4 43.1 39.6
Coarse grains 100.9 99.8 104.3 98.1 99.3 109.5 97.7
Rice 69.4 71.1 75.3 70.7 75.6 83.8 74.5
Oilseeds 102.9 102.5 104.9 102.0 102.5 107.3 102.1
Vegetable oil 53.3 51.0 53.6 50.5 47.2 53.1 46.5
Beef meat 100.4 101.4 101.6 101.3 102.4 102.5 102.4
Butter 93.0 94.2 95.3 93.6 95.8 97.4 95.6
LDC rest of world Wheat 46.0 50.9 54.4 49.9 51.4 59.7 49.8
Coarse grains 100.5 97.7 100.8 96.0 96.1 101.7 94.9
Rice 100.7 101.3 104.3 100.5 103.6 109.9 102.9
Oilseeds 89.6 86.3 89.2 85.8 82.5 87.4 81.7
Vegetable oil 19.0 18.7 19.4 18.5 18.1 19.7 17.9
Beef meat 96.2 96.5 96.7 96.5 97.2 97.4 97.2
Butter 98.7 98.1 99.1 97.6 98.2 99.8 98.0
African low-income Wheat 43.4 45.4 47.1 44.3 46.2 50.3 45.4
Coarse grains 62.5 61.5 63.2 60.4 59.6 64.3 58.8
Rice 62.3 63.3 64.5 63.0 61.9 64.6 61.6
Oilseeds 47.9 45.2 47.4 44.7 43.0 47.3 42.6
Vegetable oil 31.2 30.0 31.3 29.8 29.3 32.7 28.9
Beef meat 83.6 82.1 87.4 81.4 80.2 89.8 78.0
Butter 61.5 60.5 61.3 60.1 60.6 62.4 60.5
Asian low-income Wheat 68.9 70.3 72.4 69.4 69.2 73.9 68.3
Coarse grains 88.8 88.8 90.5 87.6 87.0 90.7 86.3
Rice 107.8 110.4 111.7 110.0 109.6 111.4 109.6
Oilseeds 72.0 71.6 74.1 71.2 72.7 77.4 72.3
Vegetable oil 241.4 230.9 242.6 225.3 229.6 257.8 225.5
Beef meat 85.0 84.9 87.3 84.4 85.1 89.4 84.0
Butter 88.2 86.5 87.8 85.7 86.8 88.9 86.4
American low-income Wheat 20.2 20.4 21.8 20.1 20.7 24.1 20.1
Coarse grains 67.3 66.8 70.3 65.4 64.6 73.8 63.1
Rice 83.2 83.9 87.9 83.5 84.7 92.3 83.5
Oilseeds 179.8 192.0 207.1 189.3 204.5 239.3 200.2
Vegetable oil 96.5 96.4 100.6 95.3 96.2 108.0 94.6
Beef meat 101.0 102.6 116.1 101.1 104.2 128.9 99.0
Butter 81.6 96.3 100.0 96.0 100.6 107.8 99.9
The regional aggregates are as in Table 2
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In China and India, the changes in the stock-to-use ratio are
generally below 1 percentage point in Scenario 2, both during
the year of the shock (2016) and by the end of the simulation
period (2021). The faster economic growth in Scenario 1 also
leads to generally lower stock-to-use ratios in China. By
contrast, in India stock-to-use ratios increase. This rise is most
pronounced in wheat, with an increase of 5.9 percentage
points compared to the baseline in 2021. As explained above,
both countries have specific domestic policies in place that
aim to stabilise domestic markets. In the case of India, these
policies not only impede production but also restrain exports
when commodity prices are high, which leads to increasing
stocks in Scenario 1.
Food security and food availability indices
Figure 4 presents the development of the three food security
and food availability indices. The food bill index shows how
expensive it will become for consumers to buy food, while the
food import index shows how expensive it will be to import
food.
Faster economic growth as simulated in Scenario 1 results
in increasing prices for agricultural commodities and hence in
increased costs to buy food when the expenditure is related
both to domestic market prices (food bill index) and to world
market prices (food import index). Despite the decreased
imports and the decreased import dependency ratio, expendi-
ture on imported food at world market prices increases more
than expenditure in domestic markets. This can be particularly
relevant for net importing countries facing balance of payment
constraints (for example foreign currency availability), as a
rise in the food import bill index suggests that these countries
may need to take out loans to be able to finance the purchases
of imported food. By 2021 the increase of the food import bill
index is between 7 and 30 % in most of the LDCs and low-
income countries, with the increase being the highest for
China (+63 %). India is the only country where the food bill
index decreases, which is related to India’s trade policy and
indicates that it becomes cheaper for the Indian consumers to
buy food.
Following Dorward (2013) we deflated the food bill index
by the consumer price index (taken from OECD-FAO 2012)
of each country to calculate the index in real terms and we
compared the annual growth of this index with the annual
income growth (indicated by the assumed real GDP growth).
The results suggest that income grows more than food expen-
diture, with the difference being more noticeable in China and
India (in both countries income grows by around 8 percentage
points more than food expenditure) and less in non-African
developing and least developed countries (where income
growth is around 2 percentage points higher than growth in
food expenditure). Thus, food expenditure is not projected to
grow more than income in Scenario 1, implying that con-
sumers should be able to finance purchases of food as long
as they do not change their non-staple food expenditure
patterns.
While the consumed calories per capita for crops continu-
ously increases for India (+3.1 % by 2021), they steadily
decrease in LDCs and low-income countries, albeit at a rela-
tively low magnitude (between −0.4 % in American low-
income countries and −1.1 % in Asian low-income countries).
The increase in India reflects the effects on domestic markets
and in particular the above discussed domestic market inter-
ventions for cereals. Furthermore, the modelled faster eco-
nomic growth also turns into reductions in consumed crop
calories per capita in China (−1.2 % by 2021). Thus, even
though the modelled faster economic growth leads to produc-
tion increases in China, all LDCs and low-income countries,
this increase is not translated into higher intake of crop food
calories per capita. In addition, in China and in LDCs the
simulated increase in economic development also leads to a
certain increase in beef meat consumption, but on average this
increase in beef meat calories does not compensate for the
decrease in staple food calories, resulting in a net decrease in
food calorie intake.
The economic downturn as simulated in Scenario 2 results
in relatively small changes in all three food security and food
availability indices. Compared to the reference scenario, indi-
ces are lower regarding the domestic food bill and the food
import bill, which is due to the slightly lower prices in both
world and domestic markets. The effects are most pronounced
in the year of the shock, and indices tend to return close to the
reference level by 2021.
The highest changes in the food bill index compared to
the reference scenario are projected for American low-
income countries and the smallest changes are projected
for India (−3 % and −0.4 % in 2016, which turns into
−1.5 % and +0.4 % respectively by 2021). Despite the
simulated economic downturn, the growth of the food bill
index in real terms remains around 4 percentage points
below real GDP growth rates in LDCs, 5 percentage
points in developing countries and 6 and 7 percentage
points in China and India, respectively. This implies that
income grows more than staple food expenses, such that
purchases of staple foods should not be threatened unless
consumers change their consumption patterns and increase
expenditures on non-staple foods.
Regarding the food import bill, the magnitude of the re-
duction is highest for China (about −6 % from 2016 through-
out to 2021), and the lowest for African low-income countries
(−5 % in 2016 and still −2 % in 2021). The lower food import
bill index should especially benefit net importing coun-
tries in financing food purchases and thus should con-
tribute positively to food availability.
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As a consequence of the lower food (import) bill, the
intake of crop food calories per capita slightly increases,
but this positive effect tapers off by the end of the
projection period in 2021.
Table. 4 Stock-to-use ratio (in percent)
2012 2016 2021
REF S1 S2 REF S1 S2
China Wheat 43.8 48.0 46.0 48.4 45.2 42.6 44.8
Coarse grains 27.7 26.5 25.3 26.9 25.2 23.3 25.0
Rice 64.7 62.6 60.9 62.8 57.4 55.6 57.2
Oilseeds 8.4 8.1 7.8 8.2 7.7 7.4 7.7
Vegetable oil 17.4 17.4 17.1 17.3 17.0 16.4 17.1
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India Wheat 19.8 16.3 18.9 16.6 16.2 22.1 16.1
Coarse grains 11.2 7.8 9.1 8.1 7.0 9.8 6.9
Rice 20.8 16.3 16.7 16.3 13.3 13.9 13.2
Oilseeds 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.0
Vegetable oil 9.2 9.4 10.2 9.7 9.5 10.3 9.5
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LDC Africa Wheat 15.4 14.4 13.3 15.5 14.1 13.1 13.7
Coarse grains 13.2 12.3 11.6 13.2 10.9 10.5 10.7
Rice 7.5 7.4 7.0 7.7 6.8 6.6 6.7
Oilseeds 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5
Vegetable oil 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.5
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LDC rest of world Wheat 44.3 42.2 38.6 45.2 41.8 38.9 40.5
Coarse grains 19.8 23.3 22.1 24.7 23.6 22.8 23.1
Rice 18.7 19.2 18.1 19.9 19.4 18.6 19.1
Oilseeds 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Vegetable oil 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.9
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
African low-income Wheat 31.6 30.2 27.7 32.5 30.8 28.6 29.9
Coarse grains 13.3 14.0 12.8 15.5 13.6 12.4 13.3
Rice 20.7 18.2 16.9 18.8 15.7 15.0 15.4
Oilseeds 4.2 4.2 3.8 4.6 4.2 3.9 4.2
Vegetable oil 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.4
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Asian low-income Wheat 24.7 22.2 20.6 23.7 22.7 21.3 22.0
Coarse grains 13.8 14.6 13.7 15.8 14.7 13.9 14.3
Rice 17.5 17.1 16.4 17.8 15.4 14.9 15.2
Oilseeds 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.5
Vegetable oil 21.2 19.1 18.4 20.6 16.9 16.3 16.8
Beef meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
American low-income Wheat 21.4 19.4 17.7 20.9 19.6 18.1 19.0
Coarse grains 11.6 12.0 11.0 13.3 12.2 11.3 12.0
Rice 11.7 12.5 11.9 13.1 11.5 11.1 11.4
Oilseeds 6.3 7.4 6.8 8.2 8.5 8.0 8.5
Vegetable oil 5.8 7.0 6.5 7.6 6.8 6.4 6.8
Beef meat 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
The regional aggregates are as in Table 2
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Discussion of results and how food security
can be reinforced
To improve the understanding of the impact of changing macro-
economic development paths on food security, the results of the
scenarios have to be discussed in the context of themicroeconom-
ic situation of individual food security. This also allows a compar-
ison of our results with findings of other studies and a discussion
of the policy implications for the reinforcement of food security.
As mentioned above, in Scenario 1 the effects of the
modelled higher economic growth on demand outweigh those
in supply. Consequently, ending stocks fall, leading to lower
stock-to-use ratios worldwide. In this context, it should be
noted that lower stocks generally imply a higher vulnerability
to increasing commodity prices, and low stocks were also
pointed out as one of the causes of the food price spike in
2008 (Headey and Fan 2008; Trostle 2008; Baffes and
Haniotis 2010; Naylor and Falcon 2010). The projected lower
Fig. 4 Food security and availability indices. Note: Regional aggregates are as in Table 2. The food import index is reported only for net importers of all
staple food commodities shown in Table 2
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stocks are particularly concerning in the context of food
security in net importing countries if, contrary to our scenario
assumptions, leading exporting countries would experience
major harvest failures over the projection period, as this could
temporally lead to further increases in world market prices.
Such developments were observed during the last decade
when availability of grain exports of Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan (which are major players on the international
grain markets) were repeatedly diminished by harvest failures
and even further reduced by the introduction of subsequent
export restrictions in these countries (Headey 2011; Rutten
et al. 2013; Fellmann et al. 2014).
With respect to the issue of lower stock-to-use ratios, our
scenario results bring the discussion on food reserves into
focus. The need and usefulness of an international
institutional arrangement for food reserves was recently
highlighted by von Braun (2009) and von Braun and Torero
(2009). The implementation of an independent global buffer
stock (von Braun 2009; von Braun and Torero 2009) could be
considered as the most straightforward approach to deal with
the problems of low stocks at an international level. However,
such an institutional arrangement may be flawed by several
obstacles regarding its practical implementation, especially
with regard to identifying appropriate price triggers (Wright
2009; Gilbert 2011; Tangermann 2011). In practical terms, the
implementation of an independent international emergency
food reserve for humanitarian assistance seems more promis-
ing, as it could specifically be designed to mitigate food
shortages in LDCs and low-income countries in case of food
price spikes (von Braun and Torero 2009; FAO et al. 2011;
Tangermann 2011). However, our simulation results show that
if economic growth would develop as in Scenario 1 (i.e. at a
constantly faster rate than that assumed in the reference), then
agricultural commodity prices would also constantly increase.
This indicates that in this case an emergency food reserve
would also most likely not be an appropriate tool, as it would
be meant to bring only short-term relief to food availability
constraints in times of temporary prices spikes, but not to
counter continuously increasing agricultural commodity
prices. In this context, a global framework of food stamp
schemes specifically designed to target vulnerable low-
income consumers in developing countries could be a prom-
ising alternative (Josling 2011). Within this framework, food
stamp schemes should be voluntarily implemented and
governed at the national level but under common international
rules, with the latter facilitating the possibility to finance the
schemes from international sources. Such schemes would be
generally beneficial in times of both low and high food prices,
but when prices are high they would provide an especially
useful additional mechanism for increasing international sup-
port (Josling 2011).
Regarding the specific risk of increasing agricultural com-
modity prices for net importing countries, the FAO (2010) and
Tangermann (2011) discuss the possibility of establishing and
funding a Food Import Financing Facility. Furthermore, sev-
eral authors highlight the use of futures contracts or options
(as well as forward contracting) as tools to manage price risks
(e.g. Sarris et al. 2005; Sarris 2010; Gilbert 2011; Tangermann
2011). However, with regard to stock holding, Gilbert (2011)
points out that futures and options may solve global
stockholding only to the extent that price risk is insurable
and therefore can be offset. Moreover, Gilbert specifically
emphasizes that access to futures markets should not be taken
for granted, and can be especially problematic for LDCs
(Gilbert 2011). Therefore, international assistance could be
provided to support and/or facilitate the use of international
commodity exchanges in developing countries. However, it is
important to recognize that futures contracts and options do not
guarantee the actual delivery, by the supplier of the commodity
to the place/country where it is needed. In this context Sarris
(2010) and Tangermann (2011) discuss the implementation of an
International Grain Clearing Arrangement, which would have
the objective of guaranteeing grain import contracts between
private and public agents, which would hold physical reserves.
Regardless of an increased use of commodity exchanges or
the implementation of food stamp schemes (or any other food
safety net), a productive and growing domestic agricultural
sector is imperative to alleviating pressures of rising food
prices in the long-term. Accordingly, investments in agricul-
tural research and development are still considered to be
among the most efficient and effective measures to improve
domestic food security in developing countries in the long
term (see e.g. Evenson and Fuglie 2010; Alwang and Norton
2011; Anderson et al. 2013).
Faster economic growth only in emerging markets, the EU
and the USA as simulated under Scenario 1 results in higher
consumption, which drives world market prices for all agri-
cultural commodities upwards. The higher prices trigger an
increase in worldwide production. However, the production
increase is not as high as the consumption increase, so world
market prices remain high. Thus, countries that are net im-
porters of agricultural commodities are most hit by increased
prices due to economic growth as modelled in Scenario 1. The
scenario results indicate that the modelled faster economic
growth also induces substantial production increases in
LDCs and low-income countries. However, the consumption
increases in these countries are of a lower magnitude than the
production increases. This implies that the modelled faster
economic growth can help low-income countries to improve
their trade balance but does not necessarily give them the
incentive to address domestic food security concerns by
boosting domestic consumption. Moreover, even though the
increased domestic production improves self-sufficiency and
reduces LDCs’ and low-income countries’ import dependen-
cy, these countries remain substantial net importers. With
increases in their food import bill between 7 % and 30 %,
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the final rise in the food bill ranges between 7 % and 22 % by
2021 compared to the reference scenario. As a consequence,
the consumed staple food calories per capita decrease by up to
1.1 % over the projection period. The main reason of this
decrease is the higher cost of staple foods.
The introduction of a downwards economic shock as in
Scenario 2 results in lower consumption in the year of the
shock, followed by reduced production in the next year.
Cereal markets demonstrate a more elastic reaction to price
responses than processed food markets and livestock com-
modities. This leads on the one hand to relatively higher
reductions of world market prices for cereals compared to
livestock commodities, but on the other hand cereal markets
also experience a quicker return to their initial baseline
levels. However, the simulation results demonstrate that it
takes more than 5 years for the markets to recover and absorb
the demand shock. As a consequence of the decreases in
world market prices, LDCs and low-income countries in-
crease their imports of agricultural commodities, hence alter-
ing their import dependency ratio. Nonetheless, as the costs
for food imports decrease, the actual food bill also declines,
which makes it cheaper for consumers in LDCs and low-
income countries to buy food, and results in a slightly higher
food calorie intake per capita. Thus, regarding food security
the scenario results indicate that, at least in the short to
middle run, LDCs and low-income countries would actually
be better off with the simulated downward shock. On the
other hand, with slightly decreased self-sufficiency and
stock-to-use ratios (and especially as they become more
dependent on food imports), this also implies that LDCs
and low-income countries become more vulnerable to dis-
ruptions in the world market and increasing agricultural
commodity prices, particularly in the case of abrupt food
price spikes. Correspondingly, the results of Scenario 2 un-
derline the aforementioned need for food safety nets and
investments in a productive and growing domestic agricul-
tural sector in developing countries.
For the simulation scenarios, we introduced both the
positive and negative economic shocks only in emerging
countries, the EU and the USA. However, it is worth
noting that many developing countries are financially
and commercially integrated into global economic de-
velopments, and thus growth in developing countries is
linked to growth in developed countries (Lewis 1980;
Goldstein and Kahn 1982; Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson
2010). Therefore it can be expected that the modelled
changes in economic growth would also have positive
(Scenario 1) or negative (Scenario 2) spillover effects
on economic growth rates in developing countries. In
the case of positive spillover effects and positive eco-
nomic growth in developing countries, this would result
in higher developing country incomes, which could
offset the impact of the rising food bill.
It should also be noted that the modelled price
changes for agricultural commodities have ambiguous
effects on poverty and hunger. For example, while ris-
ing prices increase the cost for consumers they also
increase the income of farmers (who actually represent
a majority of the world’s poor). Thus the final effect of
changing agricultural prices on food security depends on
whether a household/country is a net seller/exporter or
net buyer/importer (FAO, WFP and IFAD 2011;
Dorward 2012; Swinnen and Squicciarini 2012). One
might also argue that in our analysis we focus on food
availability and access on a country (or even more
aggregated) level, but that it is actually the household/
individual level that is decisive with regard to food
security. However, most developing countries are net
food importers (Valdés and Foster 2012) and likewise,
the urban poor and the majority of rural poor people in
developing countries are net food buyers with a high
share of food expenditure and a rather inelastic demand
for food (Compton et al. 2010; FAO, WFP and IFAD
2011; Dorward 2012). Therefore our simulation results
not only give a good indication on how macroeconomic
shocks generally affect food security on the aggregate
country level but also point to the effects on poor net
buyers of food. Accordingly, it can be expected that
poor net food buyers in LDCs and low-income countries
are most affected by the modelled higher agricultural
commodity prices in Scenario 1 and the respective de-
crease in intake of food calories per capita. For this
reason, our results support findings from other studies
(like e.g. Brinkman et al. 2010; Christian 2010; Filipski
and Covarrubias 2012) that highlight the negative ef-
fects of the high food prices in 2008 on food security,
especially with regard to reduced access to nutritious
food in developing countries.
Conclusions and final remarks
In agricultural commodity market outlooks it is usually as-
sumed that there will be a smooth and steady path of recovery
out of the recent economic crisis. However, there is increased
uncertainty that such a smooth recovery will actually occur.
This paper assesses how upward and downward shocks in
economic growth would impact the developments on agricul-
tural commodity markets in the period 2012–2021. In one
scenario, we analyse how higher economic growth in emerg-
ing markets, the EU and the USA affect agricultural markets.
In a second scenario, the effect of the reoccurrence of an
economic downturn as experienced during 2008 and 2009 in
the same set of countries on the initially projected develop-
ments on agricultural commodity markets is assessed. The
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analysis uses the partial equilibrium recursive dynamic model
AGLINK-COSIMO.
The focus of this paper is on the macroeconomic level,
such that other important factors that determine agricultural
commodity prices and supply and demand are not assessed.
Yield fluctuations caused by weather can have especially
significant localised effects and provoke famines in the affect-
ed regions. Furthermore, harvest failures in major grain-
exporting countries can also lead to large world market price
swings, with particularly adverse effects for net importing
countries. This implies that yield uncertainties, although not
covered in this paper, are often more important for temporary
and/or regional food security crises than macroeconomic
developments.
The macroeconomic environment needs to be judged based
on whether it favours or dampens the risk of food security
crises. Our scenario results show that the modelled faster
economic development (Scenario 1) has larger effects on
agricultural markets and food security than the modelled
temporary economic shock (Scenario 2). In addition,
Scenario 1 leads to generally higher prices (ranging between
36% and 59 %, depending on the commodity), which favours
farmers but at the same time has adverse effects on consumers,
especially in net food-importing countries. Nevertheless, the
higher economic growth can be expected to lead to average
income increases and make it easier for the urban poor to
purchase food. Of course the latter effect largely depends on
how economic growth affects income and income distribu-
tion. The observed decrease of stock-to-use ratios in Scenario
1—albeit small and between 1 and 3 percentage points (com-
pared to the reference scenario)—indicates that agricultural
markets might be more under stress and prone to temporary
and/or regional food security crises. On the other hand, it
could be expected that in a faster-growing world economy,
fewer people are at risk. The implications of the temporary
economic shock simulated in Scenario 2 are more difficult to
judge as the crisis would lower food prices, but income would
also likely fall. Thus, it generally depends on the severity and
length of the shock, but the scenario results indicate that the
effects of a one-year shock are still not completely worn off
after a 5-year period, with world market prices for cereals
being about 6 % lower, and those for oilseeds and livestock
commodities about 5 % below the reference scenario.
Food security depends on the availability of food (whether
enough food is physically available either through domestic
production or imports) and on access to food (which is related
to prices). Our analysis sheds light on effects of positive and
negative economic shocks on agricultural commodity prices
and food availability with regard to both domestic production
and the role of trade to balance food surpluses and deficits.
The simulations show that there is no homogeneous reaction
to economic shocks among individual countries. The changes
in domestic production and consumption are limited while
changes in imports, exports and ending stocks are more visi-
ble. These developments would be higher if the simulations
on economic growth would cover more countries. Returning
to the question of the title of the paper, the results demonstrate
that both positive and negative shocks in global economic
growth indeed affect agricultural commodity markets and
food security. The precise magnitude of the effects, and thus
the answer to the question of whether the effects turn out to be
really ‘shocking’, clearly depends on the magnitude of the
introduced economic shock. However, in the light of ongoing
discussions on global food security, the findings of the paper
cast doubt on whether all countries, and in particular devel-
oping ones, have the capacity to cope with changes on agri-
cultural markets induced by economic shocks.
Disclaimer The views expressed are purely those of the writers and
may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of
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